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1. Introduction to this half-planned special issue 
 
When this journal was launched, in 2009, Martin Krygier edited a special issue on The fall of European 
Communism: 20 years after. It was not a confident celebration of rule of law reforms in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  The authors cautioned that it was not possible to generalize about success or failure 
because too many countries and too many variables were involved. Moreover, what is twenty years in 
the lifespan of the rule of law in any country? Yet they believed that a basic level of democracy and 
the rule of law had been achieved and that the break with the past was irreversible. As Venelin Ganev 
wrote: ‘It would take a great deal of paranoid imagining to conjure up a scenario where ruling parties 
in the region cancel elections, imprison opposition activists on trumped up charges, and suppress the 
democratic process. And that power-holders in the EU’s newest members will suspend their country’s 
constitution, dismantle the fundaments of democratic governance and unleash large-scale repressive 
measures against the citizenry is as remote a possibility as it is in the ‘core Western democracies’ where 
the Rule of Law originated’.3 
However, in the summer of 2012 a crisis in Romania was more or less averted, while Hungary was 
dismantling the rule of law with breathtaking speed after Fidesz’s electoral victory in 2010.4 And in late 
2015, after the victory of the PiS party, Poland surprised both domestic audiences and outside 
observers with a well-planned and comprehensive attack on the independence of the judiciary and the 
media.5 The year 2009 now seems a long time ago.  
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 On 22 November 2017 we organized a workshop and a public debate to reflect on the rule of law decay 
in Poland in De Balie in Amsterdam.6 We planned a special issue of the HJRL with papers by Marta 
Bucholc, Gabor Halmai, Radek Markowski and Wojciech Sadurski. Later, we asked Gábor Attila Tóth to 
complement the collection by reflecting on constitutional markers of contemporary authoritarianism. 
But as these papers were being reviewed and published online, other, unsolicited papers kept coming 
in which were thematically so closely related that it seemed unnatural to keep them out of the issue. 
So papers by Tom Gerald Daly, Bogdan Iancu, Lisa Louwerse and Eva Kassoti, and Oliver Mader were 
incorporated. 
The collection addresses a range of issues prompted by recent developments in Poland, Hungary and 
elsewhere: How to conceptualize rule of law decay? What are its characteristics? How can it be 
explained? Can it be detected at an early stage? What is the methodology of undermining the rule of 
law? What, if anything, can outsiders, especially the EU, do to counter this decay? What lessons can 
be drawn for demands imposed on candidates by the EU in future enlargement rounds? 
 
2. Concepts and markers 
 
Democracy and the rule of law are almost universally regarded as the only legitimate form of 
government, both vis-à-vis citizens and other states. Hence, as Gabor Attila Tóth notes, ‘authoritarians 
are under pressure to pretend to be democrats’. This is one of the reasons why there are now so many 
political and academic concepts to refer to authoritarianism masked as constitutional democracy:  
illiberal democracy, abusive constitutionalism, democratic rot, abusive constitutionalism etcetera.  
The special issue commences with an introduction by Tom Gerald Daly into the landscape of this rapidly 
expanding ‘conceptual bazaar’.7 He argues that the emerging field can best be termed democratic 
decay, which he defines as the incremental degradation of the structures and substance of liberal 
democracy.8 Daly claims that democratic decay is a new research field in its own right, just like 
transitology and consolidatology, with a research agenda which comprises such items as the discovery 
of patterns and stages of democratic decay, of subtle and less subtle methods deployed, and of early 
warning signs that the health of constitutional democracy is in danger.  
Gabor Tóth, who also discusses the rich vocabulary of the ‘new transitology’, pursues this last line of 
inquiry in his article on Constitutional markers of authoritarianism,9 thus presenting an answer to the 
question formulated by Renata Uitz a few years ago: Can you tell when an illiberal democracy is in the 
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making?10 He shows that there are various visible and less visible markers: a pseudo constitution; 
hegemonic voting practices; claims by the majority party to represent ‘the people’ instead of a part of 
the electorate; an imitation of institutional checks and balances; a superior executive with broad and 
ill-defined powers; and restrictions on fundamental rights.    
   
3. Methods 
Wojciech Sadurski dissects the methods used by PiS to dismantle the independence of the 
Constitutional Tribunal, which started the PiS ‘reform’ of the judiciary.11 There was an obvious reason 
why PiS started with the Tribunal: it could invalidate laws adopted by the new majority (and was thus 
able to play an important role as a counterbalance) and it could protect fundamental rights. But when 
turned into an instrument of the parliamentary majority, it can also ensure that legislation can be 
introduced without serious questions being asked. The PiS strategy was a combination of downright 
illegal acts (for example the government’s refusal to publish unwelcome judgments, thereby deniyng 
them any legal effect) with the quasi-legal introduction of ordinary laws which de facto changed the 
Constitution. This amounted, as Sadurski has put it elsewhere, to a ‘constitutional coup d’etat’.12 
Sadurski notes that the Constitutional Tribunal was a relatively easy target because it was the only 
body entrusted with constitutional review. ‘With hindsight, it would have been more difficult for them 
(PiS) to succeed had a legal culture been generated under which all judges, low and high, could refuse 
to apply a statute they deemed unconstitutional’. Indeed, no constitution or rule of law arrangement 
is ‘a machine that would go of itself’, as Kammen once put it13, and any functional constitution should 
at least to some extent be backed up by the legal culture in which it functions.The importance of 
culture is also discussed by Marta Bucholc, though in a different way when compared to Sadurski. 
Where he focuses on how law and institutional arrangements might be conducive to a rule of law 
culture, she shows how PiS has subverted this rule of law culture itself, especially by shaping and 
managing collective memory and perceptions. In her exploration of the cultural dimension of rule of 
law decay, Bucholc identifies the use of bricolage, retouch and re-stylization techniques. For example, 
the Polish Constitution of 1997 has in recent years been discredited by framing it as a mutation of 
communism.  The attack on the Constitutional Tribunal was thus presented as an instance of 
restorative justice aimed at abolishing the last remnants of communism. Bucholc also described how 
measures against the judiciary have been accompanied by unrelenting media coverage of the failures 
of the court system, including corruption and miscarriages of justice.  
 
4. Causes 
Propaganda is also a theme in Radek Markowski’s analysis of the causes of the electoral victory of PiS 
in 2015 and its subsequent attack on the rule of law. Markowski emphasizes that the 2015 PiS victory 
was not a landslide but an ‘electoral accident’: only 18.6 % of the eligible, or 37.5% of the active voters 
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supported PiS, which, due to election laws, turned out to be just enough for a 51% parliamentary 
majority. Interestingly, there is no evidence of a popular or electoral demand for the radical measures 
that PiS have taken since 2015. Recent events in Poland are rather ‘a classical supply side 
nationalistic/authoritarian/conservative revolution’. Yet the revolution is puzzling: PiS was already a 
well-established (opposition) political party when it came to power. Its insiders, representatives and 
leadership had benefitted from access to state resources, public sector jobs, democratic security, and 
relative prestige among part of the population. Why would they choose the radical and even hazardous 
attack on the Constitution and the judiciary? And why would a part of the electorate support the recent 
illiberal turn? Markowski offers a series of tantalizing ideas. The most striking one is that democratic 
decay is not the result of the legacy of Polish ‘Homo Sovieticus’, as many have claimed. Rather, a legacy 
of the subversion of communism through ‘adaptive resourcesfulness’, including support of the Catholic 
Church, have contributed to dispositions unconducive to trust in institutions and constitutional 
democracy.   
    
5. Remedies 
How does one ensure that EU Member States live up to the standard of the rule of law and the values 
listed in Article 2 TEU? Few questions regarding rule of law decay have generated as much scholarly 
analysis and commentary as this one.14 
Oliver Mader offers a thorough exploration of the foundations and modus operandi of rule of law 
enforcement in the EU. One of his arguments is that a rule of law culture would be fostered if the CVM 
(Certification and Verification Mechanism) were extended to all Member States. The CVM was 
introduced in 2007 when Bulgaria and Romania acceded to the EU. It was meant as a transitional 
measure –it still exists– to assist both countries in making further progress in judicial reform and the 
fight against corruption and organized crime. According to Mader, the regular, evidence-based 
monitoring which the CVM provides could give a more objective and reliable underpinning to other 
existing and proposed mechanisms to enforce the rule of law. 
 
This is an idea with traction: on March 18, Manfred Weber, the German lead candidate of the European 
People’s Party for the EU Commission presidency, together with Udo di Fabio (a former judge at the 
German Constitutional Court), proposed the establishment of a committee of independent experts 
(former judges, recognized figures from the highest national and European courts), ‘that would be 
tasked with regularly reviewing the state of play of the independence of the judiciary and freedom of 
the press; they would also investigate potential political, judicial and administrative corruption — in 
every member state of the European Union.’15 And one day later, the Belgian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (Didier Reynders) and his German colleague for European Affairs (Michael Roth) proposed a 
new mechanism for rule of law surveillance. This would ‘allow for a constructive, structured and 
interactive political discussion between all member states’, a peer review based on ’objectivity, non-
discrimination, equal treatment of all member states, following an evidence-based and nonpartisan 
approach.’16 
 
Gábor Halmai explores another avenue, which has been widely discussed by politicians and policy-
makers over the past few years: financial conditionality and financial penalties. ‘This’, former 
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Commissioner Viviane Reding has said, ‘would be the most effective way to influence the behavior of 
a government like the Polish one –making a link with the money. It is the only thing they understand’. 
Halmai does not focus on the 2018 Commission proposal for a regulation to protect the Union's budget 
in the case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in the Member States17, but on the 
Common Provision Regulation which regulates the European Structural and Investment Funds. 
According to Halmai, this Common Provision Regulation requires Member States to uphold the rule of 
law. It can be used to suspend funds. And it does not require the hurdles of a 4/5 majority or the 
unanimity of Article 7 TEU. Halmai is aware that such measures are controversial, because ordinary 
citizens, not their authoritarian governments, would suffer most. Nonetheless, the dependence of the 
governments of Poland and Hungary on the aforementioned funds is significant, and as such 
suspending funds may also embolden the political opposition.  This argument seems to be convincing 
to many. On January 17, 2019, the members of the European Parliament voted, with a 397-158 
majority, in favour of draft rules to suspend EU budget payments to the countries jeopardising the rule 
of law in their countries. More specifically, under the proposed rules, which were first tabled by the 
EU Commission in its long-term EU budget plans, governments interfering with courts or failing to 
tackle corruption will especially risk the aforementioned suspension. To be sure, these rules will still 
have to be negotiated with the member states. In any event, on the same day, the European 
Parliament tripled the proposed EU budget – from 642 to 1834 billion Euro – for promoting democracy, 
the rule of law and fundamental rights. Funding civil society organizations is an important part of this 
promotion plan that was approved with a 426-152 majority. 
    
Less well studied is the role of the Council of Europe, especially the so-called Venice Commission 
(officially: the European Commission for Democracy through Law). This Commission is the subject of 
the article by Bogdan Iancu. The Venice Commission is an expert body of the Council of Europe, 
consisting of representatives, especially senior academics, supreme or constitutional court judges or 
members of national parliaments, of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe, and of 13 other 
states. Its primary task is to assist and advise individual countries in constitutional matters, in order to 
improve the functioning of democratic institutions and the protection of human rights. Iancu describes 
the increasingly important role of the Commission in in cases of rule of law decay. He praises its 
contribution to providing guidelines and information to post-communist democracies.  But his article 
has a strong critical focus, dealing with its methodological and procedural deficiencies, leading for 
example to inconsistencies across country opinions. Iancu particularly mentions the ‘arguments from 
authority’ (referring to itself as the ultimate source of wisdom) sometimes used by the Venice 
Commission, these ‘being a last line of defense in common logic and constitutional theory alike.’ All of 
these deficiencies carry the peril of subordinating constitutionalism to instrumental considerations, 
which, although different in their degree and purpose, are not too different in kind from the 
constitutional instrumentalism of populists in Hungary, Poland or Romania. This might well result in an 
erosion of its credibility, which is a missed opportunity in times when we are in urgent need of stable 
constitutional limits and distinctions. 
 
6. Future enlargement conditionality 
It is not at all self-evident that the EU’s accession policies are responsible for recent rule of law decay 
in Hungary and Poland. For one thing, the rule of law appeared to be fairly robust in Hungary before 
2010, and in Poland before 2015. As Markowski points out, there was no demand the attack on the 
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judiciary which PiS carried out after the elections (but the fact that the Hungarian and Polish 
parliamentary majorities went to great lengths to dismantle the judiciary is of course proofthat the 
judiciary was a serious check on the exercise of their powers). Moreover, the post 2015 reforms are as 
much the result of domestic processes as they are the result of accession conditionality. Indeed, not 
all countries in Central and Eastern Europe which acceded in 2004 are witnessing rule of law decay 
today, at least not to a degree comparable to Poland and Hungary, and this variation is hard to explain 
if accession policies are an all-determining factor.  
Even so, the EU and some scholars have for a long time credited accession conditionality as an 
important and effective incentive for political transformations. So even if this accession policies are 
not an all-determining explanatory factor for rule of law decay, recent events in Poland and Hungary 
may call for a re-examination of the methodology of EU accession policies. The question, in particular, 
is whether the Commission’s operationalization of the Copenhagen political criteria has taken 
sufficient account of the fact that the rule of law not only depends on rules, procedures and 
institutions, but also on a shared understanding among the main political actors that these rules 
deserve to be respected, even if it is relatively easy for a majority party to ignore, violate or subvert 
them in the interest of unrestrained government by ‘the people’.  Lisa Louwerse and Eva Kassoti offer 
a thorough analysis of the development of rule of law accession conditionality since 2004. They argue 
that the Commission’s accession policies focus too heavily on the acquis and less on the introduction 
of formal characteristics of the rule of law. They also note an increased sensitivity of the Commission 
to the underlying societal and cultural transformation that a robust rule of law requires. They conclude, 
however, that this commitment to the cultural dimension of the rule of law is mostly lip service; it has 
not yet been incorporated in the accession methodology. 
 
7. Some concluding observations 
 
In 1997, Fareed Zakaria called attention to the term ‘illiberal democracy’, in an article in Foreign 
Affairs.18 He developed his article into a book, published in 2004, for a broader audience, with the 
telling title: The Future of Freedom.19 Zakaria noted that in a growing number of countries, democracy  
— understood as majority rule — was flourishing, while freedom was withering; elections seemed to 
pave the way for dictatorships that curtailed people’s liberty. There were thus not an insubstantial 
number of elected or re-elected regimes (amongst many others he mentioned Russia, Venezuela, the 
Palestinian Authority) that routinely violated the constitutional boundaries of their authority and 
robbed citizens of their basic rights. Zakaria was not particularly thinking about Europe. On the 
contrary, he wrote that after 1989 Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia ‘moved rapidly to establish 
liberal democracy, which has taken remarkably firm root.’ In ‘little more than a decade after the 
collapse of communism, Europe is coming tantalizingly close to becoming, in the elder George Bush’s 
phrase, “whole and free” ’.20 
 
Europe, so much was clear, was not perceived as being in ’freedoms danger zone’. We now know that 
this evaluation was a tad too optimistic. Nevertheless, in the final pages of his book and his article, 
Zakaria signalled a clear warning: the enormous societal and economic changes the world was facing, 
might well result in an ‘unfettered and dysfunctional democracy (…) that will discredit democracy itself 
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(…)’.21 We now also know that there was more than a measure of truth in this prediction. Indeed, 
democracy that is not being backed up or counterbalanced by the rule of law is an ‘empty shell’: not 
just ‘inadequate but potentially dangerous, bringing with it the erosion of liberty, the manipulation of 
freedom, and the decay of a common life.’22 
 
In the EU a series of mechanisms and procedures  — (pre)-Article 7 TEU, infringement procedures 
before the Court of Justice, the Justice Scoreboard — are currently being deployed to try and find a 
way to counter the rule of law decay in EU Member States. Many more mechanisms and procedures 
are being proposed and discussed. Yet a thorough analysis of the inner stuffings of democracy that 
cause rule of law decay is at least just as important. That is to say, again in Zakaria’s words, the 
problems of governance in the 21st century are problems within democracy. ‘This makes them more 
difficult to handle, wrapped as they are in the mantle of legitimacy’. We hope that this Special Issue 
offers useful perspectives on the challenges that accompany this deceitful ambiguity. 
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